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In this paper we examine the claim that natural resources invite civil conflict,
and challenge the main stylized facts in this literature. We find that the conventional
measure of resource dependence is endogenous with respect to conflict, and that
instrumenting for dependence implies that it is no longer significant in conflict
regressions. Instead, it appears that conflict increases dependence on resource
extraction (as a default sector). Moreover, resource abundance is associated with
a reduced probability of the onset of war. These results are robust to a range of
specifications and, considering the conflict channel, we conclude there is no reason
to regard resources as a general curse to peace and development.
JEL classifications: Q34, O11, N40, N50.
1. Introduction
The appreciation for natural resources as a driver of economic development
has undergone a dramatic change in the past decades. While economists generally
perceived an abundance of resources as advantageous until the 1980s, an
influential empirical and theoretical literature emerged in the 1990s that reached
rather opposite conclusions. The phrase ‘natural resource curse’ was coined
and, perhaps because of its paradoxical connotation, caught on in both academic
and policy circles. The current literature distinguishes between no less than
three different ‘dimensions’ of the resource curse: resources are associated with
(i) slower economic growth, (ii) violent civil conflict, and (iii) undemocratic
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regime types.1 Arguably, these different manifestations of the curse can be
inter-related.
In this paper we focus on the nature of the relation between resources and
civil war. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) offered a pioneering empirical contribution
based on cross-section analysis, where among other things they found that resource
dependence had a significant curvilinear effect on both the onset and duration
of war. As a measure of resources they used the ratio of primary exports to
GDP—a measure also popularized by Sachs and Warner (1997) in the parallel
literature focusing on the relation between resources and economic growth. In
a follow-up series of papers, Collier and Hoeffler demonstrated (i) that resources
have an impact on some types of wars, but not on others (see also Reynal-Querol,
2002); (ii) that resources are also significantly correlated with the onset of war
in a panel-data setting (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004); and finally (iii) that the
main results are robust to employing alternative measures of resource wealth
(notably a measure of resource rents, see Collier and Hoeffler, 2005).
This series of papers has proved influential and controversial, not least because
of its focus on the economic roots of conflict. By now, the standard explanations
of civil war advanced by economists and political scientists are ‘greed’ and ‘griev-
ance’.2 The rational choice paradigm considers civil war a special form of non-
cooperative behavior, and the greed motive simply reflects opportunities for
rebels (or rebel leaders) to enrich themselves. Grievance, in contrast, is rooted in
a behavioral paradigm, and emphasizes relative deprivation, social exclusion and
inequality (e.g., due to ethnic or religious divides, see Regan, 2003). In the context
of resource-rich societies, grievance might be exacerbated by insufficiently com-
pensated land expropriation, environmental degradation, inadequate job oppor-
tunities, and labour migration (e.g., Rosser, 2006). Resource rents also provide
a potential source of funding for the start-up costs associated with initiating
a rebel organization. The Collier and Hoeffler paradigm views rebels as rational
predators or, using terms with a less negative connotation, as entrepreneurs follow-
ing up on a profitable opportunity. The theoretical underpinnings of this perspec-
tive may be traced back to Grossman (1991) and Hirschleifer (1995).
..........................................................................................................................................................................
1We cannot possibly do justice to the many papers in these three fields, but selected contributions
include the following works. On economic growth, refer to Sachs and Warner (1997), Mehlum et al.
(2005), but also Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) and the citations therein. On conflict, refer to Collier
and Hoeffler (1998, 2004), Ross (2004a,b), Collier et al. (2009), Lujala (2009), and to the special issue of
the Journal of Conflict Resolution devoted to the topic. On regime type (and institutions more broadly),
refer to Ross (2001), Leite and Weidmann (2002), Jensen and Wantchekon (2004), and Bulte et al.
(2005). Overview articles include Rosser (2006) and van der Ploeg (2009).
2 Ballantine (2003) has noted that the mix of greed and grievance can be particularly potent, and relevant
as an explanation of the onset of war. Ross (2004b) examines the greed and grievance motives, along
with other possible conflict triggers, in a series of case studies. Other reasons why resources might be
linked to conflict have to do with the probability of foreign intervention (Rosser, 2006) and the prob-
ability of suffering from economic shocks (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler, 2005).
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A small ‘cottage industry’ has now emerged in economics and political science
on the purported association between natural resources and civil war (Ross,
2004a; Ron, 2005), and the resource-war link is increasingly viewed as a stylized
fact. However, this link, and in particular the economic terms within which
it has been couched, has not gone unchallenged. The first series of challenges
stems from doubts about the data and statistical analysis. If resources are
important for financing an insurgence, then arguably the ‘lootability’ of resources
is important. If so, many resources included in the standard dependence variable
are irrelevant. Worse: some relevant resource revenues—such as those obtained
by smuggling—are not included in the data. In contrast, if future resource rents
are a motive for rebellion (the prize that may be grabbed after seizing power),
then a wider range of resources might be relevant. Similarly, lumping all types
of conflict together may obscure the analysis (Le Billon, 2001).
The empirical evidence is mixed (e.g., Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002; Ross,
2004a, 2006). Ross (2003) finds little support for a link in general, but does
argue in favour of a relation between conflict and ‘lootable’ resources such
as alluvial diamonds and drugs (see also Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005; Olsson,
2006). Lujala et al. (2005) demonstrate that there is no relation between diamonds
and conflict onset, but that lootable (alluvial) and non-lootable (i.e underground)
diamonds have opposite effects on the incidence of conflict. De Soysa (2002),
Fearon (2005), Ross (2006), De Soysa and Neumayer (2007), and Lujala (2009)
emphasize the role of (legal) oil and mineral resource trading in explaining conflict,
but this is disputed by Smith (2004). Humphreys (2005) suggests dependence
on agricultural production matters, implying that social relations co-shaped by
economic structure are a driver of conflict.
A second challenge concerns the economic perspective on (potential) rebels
as the key decision maker.3 Many analysts favour explanations based on politics
and ‘state strength’ over explanations based on economics (e.g., Auty, 2004;
Dunning, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005). According to
this view, resource-rich economies tend to suffer from weak and unaccountable
leadership, which is unable or unwilling to diversify the economy and deliver key
public goods. Alternatively, resource riches may invite oppressive regimes, resulting
in genuine grievances among a share of the population.
It is not always easy to distinguish between the various mechanisms linking
resources to war. For example, while the level of income may serve as a proxy
for the opportunity cost of rebel activity entering in an economic analysis, one may
also argue that it proxies for the ‘effectiveness of the state’ in delivering public
goods (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003).
..........................................................................................................................................................................
3 Recent literature also supports the rational-rebel or greed explanation. For example, Lujala (2009) finds
that the exact location of resource endowments (in the war zone or not) matters for conflict duration,
and that the onset of conflict is affected by onshore but not by offshore oil extraction. These results
suggest that the effect of resources on rebels’ opportunity and incentives may be more important than
the effect on state revenues and capacity.
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Is this literature moving towards a consensus? If so, the pace of convergence
is very slow. Complicating matters further, there is a literature that implicates
resource scarcity, rather than abundance, as a driver of violent conflict (e.g.
Homer-Dixon, 1999). Scarcity is linked to conflict via two mechanisms: it may
trigger marginalization of powerless groups by an e´lite scrambling for resources,
and it could have a debilitating effect on processes of social and economic innov-
ation (resulting in an ‘ingenuity gap’). In the words of Hirschleifer (1995, p.44):
‘As Malthusian pressures depress per capita incomes, it comes to a choice
between fighting and starving’.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we explore the nature of the
causal link between resources and the onset of war, and provide the first attempt
in this literature to instrument for resource dependence in a two-stage procedure.4
While the literature refers to the conventional ‘ratio of primary exports to GDP’
variable as both a measure of resource dependence and abundance, it is evident
that it is at best an imperfect proxy for the latter. Resource-rich countries that
have also developed other industries may not be dependent on primary exports.
Similarly, resource-poor countries might nonetheless depend on primary produc-
tion if they host few alternative economic activities. Our key concern is that this
resource variable may be endogenous with respect to conflict (see also De Soysa,
2002; Dunning, 2005; Lujala et al., 2005; Ross, 2006; Murshed and Tadjoeddin,
2007; and Lujala, 2009).5
A similar concern applies to analyses based on scaled resource rents (rents
divided by national income), as in Collier and Hoeffler (2005) and De Soysa and
Neumayer (2007). If investments in sectors other than the resource-agricultural
complex are depressed by either past, present, or (the shadow of) future conflict,
then the nature of the resource-war link could run from conflict to resource
dependence, rather than the other way around. Investment in manufacturing
requires a stable politico-economic environment, and one may hypothesize that
the resource sector is less sensitive to mounting tensions or outright conflict
than other sectors.6 Reasons for this may include limited linkages with the rest
of the economy, the sector’s orientation towards international markets, and its
inability to relocate. Moreover, as argued by Ross (2004a, p.338): ‘using lagged
independent variables does not eliminate the danger of reverse causality: civil wars
can be preceded by years of low-level violence that drives off manufacturing firms,
producing a high level of resource dependence before the violence actually begins’.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
4We do not consider the relation between resources and conflict duration or intensity. For more work
on these issues, refer to Doyle and Sambanis (2000), Ballantine (2003), Ross (2003, 2004b), and Fearon
(2004).
5 In the resources-growth literature, this point has been made by Ding and Field (2005), Arezki and van
der Ploeg (2007), and Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008).
6 Lujala (2009) even mentions that (the shadow of future) conflict might increase resource extraction
(and hence: dependence) as it gives incumbent leaders an incentive to increase extraction to finance
investments in the military, or for personal gain.
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By instrumenting for resource dependence, we test whether it is causally linked
to conflict.
Second, we add a proxy for resource abundance—a stock variable capturing the
discounted value of the future flow of resource rents—in our empirical analysis,
and explore the relation between resource wealth and the onset of conflict anew.
Our variable naturally captures many of the interpretations associated with the
alleged resource-war link. For example, to the extent that conflicts are triggered
by greed (fighting over future resource rents), our variable better captures the
essence of what is at stake than measures of current dependence. We consider
the nature of the impact of abundance on conflict, and we test whether resource
abundance affects conflict directly, or that its effect is indirect—via income and
resource dependence.
Our main findings turn received wisdom upside down. We find that resource
dependence is indeed an endogenous variable in conflict regressions, and that
properly accounting for this endogeneity removes the positive statistical associa-
tion between dependence and conflict onset. We also demonstrate that a country’s
history with respect to war and peace is a significant determinant of resource
dependence—clenching our main result. Moreover, we find a significant negative
(indirect) relationship between resource abundance and the onset of war, prob-
ably because of an income effect. This suggests the label ‘resource curse’ may be
misplaced. Resource-rich countries have on average a lower propensity to enter
a civil war, but countries that do end up with civil strife (possibly even resource-
poor ones) will experience increasing dependence on the primary sector.
2. Data and empirical strategy
We now outline our empirical procedure and present the most important data.
Following up on the empirical strategy by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), we
first explore the determinants of resource dependence, extending the analysis
of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) to a panel dataset of nine 5-year periods between
1960–2004 (1960–4, 1965–9, etc.).7 We then proceed by analysing the impacts
of resource dependence as well as abundance on the propensity of the onset
of conflict. Our main resource abundance stock variable may directly affect the
probability of conflict (through rebellion motives), but the influence may also
be indirect through resource dependence or income.
We run three different regression equations—a resource dependence equation,
an income equation, and a conflict regression equation. The first regression is
important to assess whether resource dependence RD (denoted by sxp or lnsxp in
the tables, calculated as primary exports divided by GDP at the start of each period)
..........................................................................................................................................................................
7 Fearon (2005) demonstrates that the results of Collier and Hoeffler are not robust to using annual
panel data. However, it is not evident that annual data better capture the potentially ‘slow dynamics’ that
may trigger the onset of war.
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is a proper exogenous variable in conflict regressions, as implicitly assumed until
now. Specifically, we try to unravel the determinants of resource dependence as
follows:
RDðti Þ ¼ a0 þ a1conditioning variablesðtiÞ þ a2RAðti Þ þ e, ð1Þ
where RA measures resource abundance in period t in country i, and e is an
error term. An analogous regression is run with (log) per capita income levels
(lngdp) as the dependent variable, as income may be endogenous as well.
RA is included to account for the notion that resource-rich economies may
have a comparative advantage in exporting primary products (in the resource
dependence regression), or that resources may have an income effect via sales
or access to foreign credit (in the case of the income regression). We use estimates
of the net present value of rents (in USD per capita) of a country’s total
natural capital stock, taking the natural logarithm of the value to reduce the influ-
ence of outliers (denoted as lnnatcap). The aggregate measure includes subsoil
assets (fuel and non-fuel minerals), cropland, pastureland, timber and non-
timber forest resources, and protected natural areas. We also consider two dis-
aggregate measures, focusing on fuel and non-fuel mineral resources (lnsubsoil)
and land (lnland, including crop- and pastureland, protected areas, and forest
resources) separately. All these RA estimates are taken from extensive studies
by the World Bank (1997, 2006), and we refer to World Bank (1997, ch.3) for
details about the computation of the net present values. Drawbacks of the vari-
ables are their limited country and time coverage: they are available for around
100 countries, and only two years (1994 and 2000).8
It can be argued that resource abundance is a relatively persistent variable.
However, to test the robustness of our results, we also use alternative measures
of resource abundance, namely per capita estimates of the value of total reserves
of fuel and non-fuel minerals (including industrial diamonds) in 1970 from
Norman (2009), and the per capita production and reserves of oil from 1960–99
from Humphreys (2005). Both datasets cover a wider range of countries, bringing
the sample coverage up to 115 and 118 countries, respectively, albeit at the cost
of omitting all non-mineral natural resources from the analysis.
How ‘exogenous’ are our resource abundance measures? We argue that the
data on natural resource abundance are likely to be relatively independent of
local issues (including conflict intensity), and therefore exogenous for our purpose.
The (fuel and non-fuel) mineral deposits have been well explored and estimated
due to the potentially large profits they present, and thanks to the involvement
of large multinational firms who operate with little regard for local political or
technological conditions. Of course, our resource abundance data are not perfect,
..........................................................................................................................................................................
8We chose to use the 1994 values for the periods until 1999, and the 2000 values for the last period from
2000–2004. All our results are robust to using only the earlier or later data throughout the sample
period.
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as the present value of rents is not completely invariant with respect to policies,
and exploration and exploitation efforts may to some extent be determined by
the level of development. But we believe they are less prone to the policy endo-
geneity, which plagues export-based and rent-based dependency measures; and
less subject to technology standards, which influence production levels (see also
Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008). For example, the World Bank resource abun-
dance measures are not highly correlated with years of schooling, which is a
common proxy for technology levels.9 In addition, they offer the advantage
of potentially covering all natural resources in the estimation. However, in light
of the simple observation that resource stock estimates may be both greater
or smaller in conflict-prone environments (when historic extraction rates have
been decelerated or accelerated), it is evident that the appropriateness of stocks
as instruments is an empirical issue. Hence, in what follows we formally test our
hypothesis that stock variables are exogenous, and we consistently find support
for this hypothesis.10
We have several conditioning variables serving as exogenous instruments in
eq. (1). Instrumental variables should be exogenous and correlated with the 1st
stage endogenous variables (eq. (1)), but not with the error term of the 2nd stage
conflict regression (eqs (2) and (2’) below). Theory offers some guidance that
these conditions are satisfied. Our first instruments are three geographical
variables—latitude, % of land area in the tropics (tropics), and distance to the
nearest coast or navigable river (distcr). The relation between these instruments
and income has been elaborated by Sachs (2003) and others. It is also evident
that biophysical conditions can affect a country’s comparative advantage in export-
ing primary commodities (and hence its resource dependence). Moreover, there
is no indication that these instruments invite conflict directly and therefore cor-
relate with the 2nd stage error term: the geophysical feature most commonly found
to influence conflict is the degree of mountainousness (see below), which is not
directly linked to our geographical instruments. Similarly, geopolitical interests
are not captured by our variables.
A further instrument is given by the average openness to trade over the previous
five-year period (openness). While the openness variable (imports + exports/GDP)
is both an outcome of trade policy and economic development as well as a deter-
minant thereof, and could therefore be endogenous with respect to income and
resource dependence, our statistical analysis clearly demonstrates that we may use
this variable as an instrument. Furthermore, there is little reason to suspect that
..........................................................................................................................................................................
9 E.g., the correlations between years of schooling in 1970 and the (log of ) subsoil wealth are 0.38 for
1994 and 0.35 for the 2000 measure, while for the (log of ) natural capital measure the correlations are
0.53 (1994) and 0.48 (2000).
10 A further issue regarding the resource abundance measures is measurement error, which may be
introducing some amount of ‘noise’ into the data. However, measurement error can reasonably be
expected to increase the standard error, and therefore bias the significance level of the abundance
variables downward, which would not be in favour of our argument.
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openness to trade has a direct effect on conflict potential. Finally, we use a
dummy variable for a presidential-type system of government (presidential),
based on seminal contributions by Persson and Tabellini (2003), who argued
that constitutional designs affect the accountability and representativeness of the
executive. Specifically, presidentialism is associated with spending for special
interests—including the interests of the primary sector—at the expense of general
(more growth-inducing) public goods, because the incumbent decision maker
does not depend on a stable majority among the legislators as in a parliamentary
system. Presidentialism is therefore expected to positively affect resource depend-
ence, and conceivably also have a negative impact on income, while there is no
evidence that one system leads to more incidents of civil war than the other.
Equation (1) thus captures the fact that resource dependence may be influenced
by both the biophysical context (resource abundance and geography), and by the
institutional framework and the policy choices it generates (government system
and trade openness). As mentioned above, since we don’t wish to rule out a priori
that something similar applies to our income variable, we also run a series of
regressions akin to (1) but with income I (i.e. the log of GDP per capita at the
start of each period, lngdp) as the dependent variable (see also Collier et al., 2009).
Our main challenge is to examine the impact of resource dependence (RD)
and abundance (RA) on the propensity of conflict to start, both directly and
indirectly (for the case of abundance). To this end, we compare the results of
pooled instrumental variable (IV) probit and panel data IV regression analyses
with those of simple probit regressions. The final equation is thus:
warstartðti Þ ¼ b0 þ b1conditioning variablesðti Þ þ b2RDðti Þ
þ b3Iðti Þ þ b4RAðtiÞ þ v, ð2Þ
where warstart is a dummy that takes on value zero if conflict did not occur
during the period, and a value of one otherwise. v is an error term and I represents
income. It is an open question whether resource abundance has any discernable
direct effect on the onset of war when accounting for the indirect effects (i.e. via
resource dependence and income). In case our two stage regression model suggests
it does not, we continue instead by estimating a simplified model in the 2nd stage:
warstartðti Þ ¼ c0 þ c1conditioning variablesðti Þ þ c2RDðti Þ þ c3Iðti Þ þ ": ð20Þ
We treat ongoing conflicts as missing observations so as not to confuse the
onset of war with its duration, adding the number of peaceful years as a control
variable. We base our definition of civil war on the Correlates of War (COW)
database by Gleditsch (2004), which considers all organized military conflicts
with at least 1000 battle-related deaths, of which at least 5% must be inflicted
by the weaker party. Furthermore, at least one party in the conflict must be
the national government. This definition gives us a potential sample of over 160
countries and up to 93 conflict episodes between 1960–2004. In the robustness
tests, we also code ongoing conflicts as zero and introduce a dummy variable for
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conflict in the previous period, following the methodology of Fearon and Laitin
(2003). Furthermore, we consider an alternative definition of conflict based on the
Armed Conflict Database (ACD) compiled by Gleditsch et al. (2002). The ACD
classifies conflicts according to two main dimensions, the first being location
and participants: 1. extra-systemic conflicts, 2. interstate wars, 3. intrastate wars,
and 4. internationalized intrastate wars, of which we include all but interstate wars.
The second dimension is the level of violence: both minor conflicts (more than
25 battle-related deaths per year, at least 1000 deaths over the entire conflict) and
major conflicts (more than 1000 battle-related deaths per year, analogous to the
COW classification) are included, bringing the potential coverage in our sample
to 149 conflict episodes. Further details on all variables and sources are given in
the Appendix.
Equation (2) allows us to distinguish between different interpretations of the
resource-war link. If resource dependence (or abundance) exacerbates the risk
of conflict, then coefficients b2 (or b4) should take on a significant and positive
value. To gauge the total effect of resource abundance on conflict, one needs to
account for both the (possible) direct effect (measured by b4), and the indirect
effect via dependence or income (obtained by combining b2 and b3). For negative
values of b2 and b3, i.e. for sufficiently large offsetting indirect effects, the conven-
tional interpretation of the resource-war link needs revision.
The conditioning variables include a wide set of explanatory variables used in
the literature: the average annual GDP per capita growth over the previous period
(growth); the years of peace since the last conflict (or WWII) as mentioned above;
the social fractionalization measure (socialfrac) from Collier and Hoeffler (2004);
the (natural log of) population at the beginning of the period (lnpop); % of moun-
tainous terrain (mountain) from Fearon and Laitin (2003); and a dummy variable
for former French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa during 1960–99 ( frafcol, see
Collier et al., 2009). We also add a political regime measure from the Polity IV
project (polity), ranging from 10 (strong autocracy) to 10 (strong democracy),
as well as the proportion of young men aged 15–29 in the total population (young-
menpop, taken from various issues of the UN Demographic yearbook), to reflect
the potential recruitment base for rebel movements (see Collier et al., 2009).
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the main variables.
3. Regression results and robustness analysis
We now present our empirical results. In the first two columns of Table 2 (Panel A)
we derive results that are very similar to existing work. Specifically, we obtain
a (weakly) concave relationship between resource dependence and the onset of
conflict in column (1), in the sense that resource dependence initially leads to
a higher probability of conflict, but then in fact decreases the probability. Note
that the coefficient on the squared term, sxp2, is insignificant. However, we
find that the logarithmic specification using lnsxp in column (2) highlights the
correlation most clearly and robustly (see Fearon, 2005), and in what follows we
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use the log of the share of primary exports in income as our key resource depend-
ence variable.
The coefficients for the other variables are also in line with previous research.
We find a negative correlation between the onset of war on the one hand, and
income, income growth, the duration of peace, and the French colony dummy
on the other hand. There is a positive correlation between population size
and the propensity of war. The percentage of young men, the variable measuring
mountainous area, the political system (polity), and social fractionalization
appear to have no correlation with civil war.
In column (3) we introduce our aggregate resource abundance variable. It enters
with a significant and negative coefficient—countries with more abundant natural
capital appear to have a lower probability of becoming engaged in civil war. This
result holds when we run a logit estimation adjusted for the ‘rare event’ nature of
civil war, as shown in Table 4, column (1). If correct and robust, this result turns
the ‘resource curse’ interpretation upside down.
Two other effects stand out. First, the resource dependence variable (lnsxp) is no
longer significant when controlling for abundance. Second, both the significance
level and coefficient value of the income variable are attenuated. Specifically,
income is now only significant at the 10% level, and the value of its coefficient
drops from 0.39 to 0.27. This could be indicative of collinearity between income
and resource abundance. Moreover, in light of our earlier arguments, there is





Warstart 0.071 0 1
s.d. (obs) 0.257 (1311) 0 (1218) 0 (93)
Years of peace since last conflict 28.851 29.725 17.41
s.d. (obs) 15.177 (1311) 14.834 (1218) 15.056 (93)
GDP per capita (USD) (in logs) 8.235 8.344 7.473
s.d. (obs) 1.135 (1211) 1.128 (1062) 0.823 (74)
GDP growth in previous period 1.418 1.647 0.017
s.d. (obs) 3.38 (1130) 3.103 (995) 4.928 (64)
Total primary export share of GDP 0.165 0.176 0.142
s.d. (obs) 0.183 (1311) 0.191 (1190) 0.116 (86)
Total natural capital (USD per capita,
in logs)
8.441 8.497 7.868
s.d. (obs) 0.951 (821) 0.964 (733) 0.630 (41)
Oil production per capita 0.0418 0.047 0.0142
s.d. (obs) 0.2845 (1104) 0.2845 (943) 0.0376 (77)
Oil reserves per capita 0.7513 0.8574 0.1512
s.d. (obs) 6.8045 (1119) 7.3567 (955) 0.5467 (80)
Value of minerals in 1970
(USD per capita)
27.5116 31.0021 5.0909
s.d. (obs) 159.0941 (1230) 170.112 (1072) 11.0884 (76)
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reason to suspect that resource dependence and income may be endogenous. For
this reason we proceed by simultaneously instrumenting for these variables in a
series of follow-up regressions.
In columns (4)–(6) we apply a pooled two-step ivprobit model, where the two
endogenous variables are estimated in the first stage by a simple linear regression as
Table 2a Civil war onset
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





lnsxp 0.231 0.129 0.083 0.1 0.068
(2.31)** (0.97) (0.35) (0.38) (0.24)
lnnatcap 0.285
(2.05)**
lngdp 0.372 0.386 0.267 0.753 0.788 0.75
(3.37)*** (3.47)*** (1.84)* (3.20)*** (2.72)*** (2.88)***
growth 0.071 0.071 0.105 0.079 0.105 0.08
(3.07)*** (3.05)*** (2.77)*** (1.96)** (1.96)* (1.93)*
lnpop 0.153 0.167 0.128 0.111 0.112 0.111
(2.77)*** (2.89)*** (1.68)* (1.02) (0.79) (0.93)
socialfrac 0.0001 0.0001 0 0.0001 0.00002 0.0001
(1.07) (1.11) (0.69) (0.98) (0.25) (0.97)
polity 0.002 0.003 0.017 0.0375 0.035 0.036
(0.21) (0.29) (1.08) (2.01)** (1.56) (1.79)*
peaceyrs 0.021 0.02 0.018 0.011 0.008 0.011
(4.02)*** (3.91)*** (2.86)*** (1.55) (0.79) (1.53)
frafcol 0.663 0.677 0.308 0.63 0.493 0.622
(1.91)* (1.95)* (0.77) (1.60) (0.89) (1.55)
youngmenpop 1.632 1.631 8.041 8.886 5.719 9.944
(0.36) (0.36) (1.13) (1.09) (0.59) (1.19)
mountain 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.004
(1.37) (1.35) (1.65)* (0.69) (1.01) (0.74)
Res abund. var. lnnatcap lnsubsoil lnland
Observations 865 865 696 688 505 676
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.21 0.21
Log likelihood 176.1 176.1 116.2
Correctly classified 93.06% 93.18% 94.54% 94.04% 94.04% 93.93%
(4/62, 2) (4/62, 1) (1/38, 1) (4/38, 7) (2/23, 5) (3/37, 7)
Wald exogeneity p 0.0200 0.0655 0.0519
Joint endogeneity p 0.0089 0.0524 0.0206
Notes: Dependent variable is warstart. 2nd stage results shown for IV-probit estimations in columns
(4)–(6). Correctly classified in percent; amount wars predicted correctly out of total and amount
falsely predicted wars given in parentheses below. p-values given for Wald test of exogeneity and
joint endogeneity test (Wu-Hausman test in linear regression). Absolute value of z-statistics in
parentheses. *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions
include an intercept (not shown).
c. n. brunnschweiler and e. h. bulte 661
in eq. (1), while the second stage uses a probit approach to determine the prob-
ability of the onset of war, following eq. (20). The available exogenous instruments
for dependence and income include openness, presidential, latitude, distcr, and
tropics. We now also include resource abundance as an exogenous instrument,
since the second-stage results and test statistics clearly indicate that abundance
has no significant direct effects on the onset of conflict after instrumenting for
dependence and income (implying that the effects of abundance are indirect—see
Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008, for additional discussion and motivation).11
Equation (2) is therefore not the most appropriate approach.
Table 2b First stage results from ivprobit estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B lnsxp from lnsxp from lnsxp from lngdp from lngdp from lngdp from







openness 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.001 0.004
(8.23)*** (7.27)*** (6.88)*** (5.15)*** (0.99) (4.26)***
presidential 0.186 0.274 0.162 0.16 0.097 0.202
(2.45)** (3.41)*** (2.06)** (2.31)** (1.27) (2.78)***
latitude 0.587 1.583 0.602 0.782 1.806 0.702
(1.76)* (4.78)*** (1.74)* (2.56)*** (5.72)*** (2.19)**
distcr 0.00002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0008 0.0005
(0.26) (1.31) (0.71) (5.73)*** (7.50)*** (5.80)***
tropics 0.905 1.064 0.884 0.416 0.34 0.445
(7.17)*** (8.12)*** (6.79)*** (3.61)*** (2.72)*** (3.70)***
peace years 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.013 0.007
(2.68)*** (2.18)** (2.82)*** (4.63)*** (7.00)*** (4.37)***
Adj R2 0.57 0.70 0.54 0.75 0.75 0.73
Notes: 1st stage results for all exogenous instruments from two-step IV-probit in Panel A, plus coefficient
for years of peace. Over-identification tests from linear regressions for specifications (4), (5), and (6) are
respectively: (Sargan N*R-sq 0.1516, Basmann 0.1564), (0.3894, 0.4013), (0.1092, 0.1128). F-statistics
for tests on excluded instruments from linear regressions for lnsxp and lngdp in specifications (4), (5),
and (6) are respectively: (49.62, 93.64), (51.82, 63.36), (31.30, 65.77). Absolute value of t-statistics
in parentheses. *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions
include an intercept (not shown).
..........................................................................................................................................................................
11 If included in the second-stage specification (i.e. not as exogenous instruments in the first stage only),
the total natural capital and subsoil variables both enter with a positive sign with p-values of 0.981 and
0.473, respectively. Land has a negative sign and a p-value of 0.826. Identification tests for all resource
abundance measures show that they are proper exogenous instruments.
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First-stage regression results for our six exogenous instruments, matching the
regressions in columns (4)–(6) in Panel A, are provided in Panel B of Table 2.
Results for resource dependence are reported in columns (1)–(3), and for income
in columns (4)–(6). The three ivprobit specifications shown correspond to three
different resource abundance variables in the first stage. In specification (4)
(columns (1) and (4) of Panel B) we use the aggregate resource abundance variable.
In contrast, specification (5) (columns (2) and (5)) is based on subsoil resources
only (fuel and non-fuel mineral resources), and specification (6) (columns (3) and
(6)) is based on land.
The first-stage results are consistent with intuition and show that our instru-
ments are strong.12 Resource dependence is a positive function of all three
measures of resource abundance, openness to trade, a presidential dummy, and
tropical area. Income is a positive function of resource abundance, openness,
and latitude, and negatively affected by presidential systems, distance to navigable
rivers and the coast, and tropical land area. While the positive correlation between
resource abundance and income appears counterintuitive in light of the resource
curse literature relating resources to slow growth, it is consistent with results
reported Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), and it is arguably in line with a
positive income effect due to resource wealth. This positive income effect could
be due for example to the sale of resources or—indirectly—to an improved capacity
to borrow money (i.e. resources as collateral), enabling governments to invest or
provide certain public goods that raise income. However, we are reluctant to
speculate on the exact transmission channels without a more detailed analysis,
which goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Returning to Panel A, the test statistics at the bottom—the Wald exogeneity test
from the ivprobit estimation and the joint endogeneity test from linear estima-
tion—provide clear support for the idea that income and resource dependence
are jointly endogenous, and that instrumenting for these variables is necessary
to obtain unbiased estimates of the causal relationships running from dependence
and income to the onset of conflict. The test statistics also confirm that the instru-
ments are appropriate: over-identification tests (Basmann and Sargan N*R-square
tests) and the tests on the excluded instruments, all performed in linear regres-
sion,13 show that we have strong and properly exogenous instruments (see the
..........................................................................................................................................................................
12 The over-identification test results for specification (6) are borderline. However, upon removing the
presidentialism variable, the statistic jumps up to 0.5 without qualitatively affecting any of the other
coefficients or standard errors. For consistency we have chosen to present the results using all six
exogenous instruments in every specification. Note that in all estimations, results do not change quali-
tatively when we remove either the resource abundance or trade openness instrument, or both.
13 As one referee pointed out, this means that the test results reported in the paper should be interpreted
with some caution, as they are not adjusted for the second-stage probit estimation: the linear treatment
slightly changes the results, but they are generally close enough to be able to have confidence in the test
statistics.
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notes to Table 2 for details). We also note that the ivprobit procedure improves
the overall predictive strength of the model.14
The most important results are threefold. First, the peace variable is no longer
significant. Instead, first-stage results presented in Panel B show that peace
is strongly correlated with both lower resource dependence and higher per capita
incomes. In preliminary dynamic panel data estimations (results available upon
request), this reverse causality appears confirmed: peace diminishes resource
dependence, and resource dependence does not make conflict more likely. This
issue deserves a more in-depth analysis in future research. Second, higher incomes
again attenuate the risk of conflict. Indeed, its coefficient has nearly tripled and
is consistently highly significant. Third, there is no evidence of a negative causal
relation from dependence to conflict. After we instrument for dependence, the
effect vanishes, which suggests the correlation between these variables was in part
driven by the impact of conflict on the composition of exports and income—shift-
ing in favour of primary commodities. Columns (4)–(6) indicate that this is true
for our aggregate abundance measure, for subsoil resources, and also for land.15
This brings us to our main result. Resource-rich countries are not generally
‘cursed’ in the sense that they run a greater risk of being torn apart by civil
wars. Indeed, the opposite seems true: resource wealth has a positive and signifi-
cant effect on income, and this in turn reduces the risk of war. Our results support
the alternative hypothesis that resource scarcity may be a trigger of conflict. While
some analysts have argued that scarcity might be especially relevant in the context
of land-based resources (Andre and Platteau, 1998), our findings suggests that
the mechanism may be more general. As far as the magnitude of this effect is
concerned, we find that increasing resource abundance by one standard deviation
reduces the risk of war from 7.1% to 6.9%, or a 3% reduction in risk (evaluating
variables at the sample mean).
3.1 Robustness analysis
Are these results robust to alternative model specifications? In Table 3 we provide
the second-stage results of a series of representative examples (first-stage results
for income and dependence are omitted to save space, but are similar to those
shown in Table 2, Panel B). While the significance of specific control variables
varies across specifications (e.g., fractionalization, polity, duration of peace and
the French colony dummy), our main results are robust. Similarly (but not
..........................................................................................................................................................................
14 Note that the use of the efficient two-step ivprobit procedure precludes the possibility of calculating
post-estimation statistics such as marginal effects and goodness-of-fit measures. Where possible, these
were estimated with maximum-likelihood ivprobits; where no goodness-of-fit measures are reported, no
convergence occurred.
15We have also experimented with using an alternative resource dependence variable. Specifically, we
have used log(mineral exports) capturing fuels, ores and metals, and find very similar results: (instru-
mented) dependence is not significant, and there is a positive indirect effect of abundance via income.
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Table 3 Specification tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnsxp 0.212 0.065 0.097 0.251 0.121 0.081
(0.85) (0.27) (0.33) (0.82) (0.42) (0.26)
lngdp 0.840 0.774 1.338 0.802 0.702 0.716
(3.71)*** (3.19)*** (3.98)*** (3.61)*** (3.04)*** (2.94)***
growth 0.073 0.079 0.082 0.055 0.102 0.098
(1.76)* (1.86)* (1.95)* (2.13)** (3.36)*** (3.20)***
lnpop 0.017 0.113 0.068 0.039 0.189 0.173
(0.15) (1.02) (0.60) (0.38) (1.92)* (1.66)*
socialfrac 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(1.14) (0.63) (1.45) (1.66)* (1.62)
polity 0.036 0.044 0.053 0.017 0.025 0.023
(1.82)* (2.22)** (2.60)*** (1.10) (1.51) (1.38)
peaceyrs 0.002 0.016 0.001 0.014 0.012 0.012
(0.24) (2.05)** (0.06) (2.31)** (1.99)** (2.02)**
frafcol 0.741 0.666 0.346 0.828 0.817 0.839
(1.68)* (1.68)* (0.82) (2.25)** (2.15)** (2.21)**
youngmenpop 10.46 6.143 4.177 7.031 0.581 1.230
(1.18) (0.68) (0.48) (1.25) (0.11) (0.23)
mountain 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002























Res. abund. var. lnnatcap lnnatcap lnnatcap minerals pc oil prod pc oil res pc
Observations 671 688 688 814 808 810
Correctly classified 94.33% 91.52% 92.45% 92.35%
(5/38, 6) (8/61, 16) (5/58, 8) (5/59, 8)
Wald exogeneity p 0.0097 0.0442 0.001 0.0314 0.109 0.108
Joint endogeneity p 0.0009 0.0389 0.0001 0.0573 0.116 0.0964
(continued)
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shown—details available on request) we found the same set of results when switch-
ing to a linear pooled 3SLS approach (predicting income, dependence, and the
onset of civil war in three simultaneous equations).
In column (1) we explore the consequences of introducing additional controls
commonly used in conflict regressions (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Ross, 2006),
as well as substituting the social fractionalization variable for a measure of
ethnic polarization developed by Reynal-Querol (2002). Social fractionalization
has been a popular measure in the conflict literature, but polarization may
better capture ethnic divisions. Ethnic polarization consistently enters positively
and significantly, showing that polarization between a limited number of ethnic
groups is more likely to lead to conflict than a highly fractionalized society with
many small groups. However, the introduction of this variable does not alter our
main results: resource dependence is still not significantly different from zero, and
abundance lowers the risk of the onset of conflict via an income effect.
Our main results also prove robust to including measures of political instability,
a dummy for newly independent states or for countries with non-contiguous
territories, and income inequality (column (1)), or period or decade dummies
(the latter is shown in column (2)). In column (3), we introduce regional dummies
for Latin America (latam) and Sub-Saharan Africa (ssa). Again, the main coeffi-
cients of interest are unaffected. Interestingly, and in contrast to our expectations,
the African dummy enters significantly and with a negative sign.
In columns (4)–(6) we use alternative abundance variables, and demonstrate
that our results are no artefact of our abundance measure. The alternative datasets
have wider coverage than the World Bank dataset, increasing the number of obser-
vations as well as the included conflict episodes.
In column (4) we use a new mineral reserves dataset constructed by Norman
(2009). All our previous results carry through. First-stage results (not shown)
Table 3 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrument overid p 0.9105 0.1149 0.244 0.0556 0.0136 0.0243
Excl. instr. F lnsxp 42.84 49.42 42.51 25.82 31.88 24.81
Excl. instr. F lngdp 83.64 93.01 49.62 52.03 65.18 50.03
Notes: All estimations IV-probit; only 2nd stage results shown, with warstart as dependent variable.
Exogenous instruments for lnsxp and lngdp in 1st stage are openness, presidential, latitude, tropics,
distcr, and a natural resource abundance measure. The natural resource abundance variable in columns
(1)–(3) is taken from the World Bank; per capita values of fuel and non-fuel minerals in 1970 in column
(4) based on data by Norman (2009); per capita oil production and reserves data in columns (5) and
(6), respectively, are from Humphreys (2005). Correctly classified in percent; amount wars predicted
correctly out of total and amount falsely predicted wars given in parentheses. Joint endogeneity
test (Wu-Hausman), instrument over-identification test (Sargan N*R-sq), and tests on excluded
instruments (F-statistics) performed in linear regression. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses.
*, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions include an
intercept (not shown).
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again indicate a positive and significant relation between abundance and income,
and the second-stage results confirm that income negatively affects conflict
risk—the same indirect channel as identified and discussed above. Moreover,
using this new abundance variable to instrument for resource dependence again
shows that lnsxp is no longer significant.
In columns (5) and (6) we use an even narrower resource abundance variable,
and focus on oil only. As mentioned above, various authors implicate oil as
a driver of the onset of war, and especially in the post Cold War era there are
several high-profile case studies of conflict where oil appears to have played
a role. To analyse this we take, respectively, per capita oil production and oil
reserves data from Humphreys (2005). While we are not confident that the
production data are fully exogenous (the reserves data are more consistent with
the other abundance variables used in this paper), it is comforting to observe
that our main first and second stage results are confirmed. These results provide
no support for the idea of a special ‘curse of oil’, suggesting that conceptual
distinctions between point and diffuse resources (e.g., Isham et al., 2005; Bulte
et al., 2005) may not be that relevant across-the-board in the context of predicting
civil wars.
Note that although the F-statistics for the excluded instruments remain
strong, the over-identification tests in columns (4)–(6) of Table 3 indicate that
not all instruments are valid. The problematic instruments turn out to be the
measure of land area in the tropics in all three specifications, and additionally
the presidential dummy in specifications (5) and (6). Dropping these instruments
improves the test statistics, leaving us with a set of strong exogenous instruments
without qualitatively affecting our main results.
Results from further robustness tests are reported in Table 4. Column (2) reports
results from a random-effects panel regression while instrumenting for income
and resource dependence, using the same data as before.16 In contrast to earlier,
pooled ivprobit analyses, we have now estimated a linear equation. Regardless,
we find the main results are robust with respect to the nature of the estimation
method.
In column (3) we adjust our approach of tackling ongoing conflict, coding it as 0
instead of missing, and adding a dummy variable for conflict in the previous period
instead of peace years to avoid confusing war onset and duration. While including
a dummy for ongoing conflict does not affect any of our main results from the first
and second stages, it does compromise significance levels of some of our control
..........................................................................................................................................................................
16 Note that a random effects model assumes that the country fixed effects are uncorrelated with the
error term and other explanatory variables. This strong assumption is unlikely to be fully satisfied, and
the random effects results should be interpreted with proper caution. However, while a fixed effects
model would arguably be preferable, we prefer not to use such a specification because several of our
explanatory variables and exogenous instruments display little or no variation over time. A fixed effects
model renders some of our key results insignificant, although the signs remain consistent (results
available from the authors on request).
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Table 4 Robustness tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)





relogit xtivreg ivprobit ivprobit ivprobit
lnsxp 0.217 0.002 0.065 0.627 0.559
(0.66) (0.09) (0.28) (2.60)*** (2.62)***
lnnatcap 0.544
(1.86)*
lngdp 0.484 0.070 0.804 0.748 0.618
(1.79)* (4.10)*** (3.57)*** (3.66)*** (3.42)***
growth 0.193 0.009 0.064 0.002 0.001
(2.34)** (2.51)** (1.69)* (0.06) (0.03)
lnpop 0.240 0.012 0.114 0.373 0.297
(1.33) (1.27) (1.10) (3.62)*** (3.34)***
socialfrac 0.0001 0.00001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.69) (1.54) (1.28) (2.15)** (2.33)**
polity 0.034 0.004 0.032 0.035 0.023
(1.06) (2.20)** (1.72)* (2.10)** (1.46)
peace years 0.031 0.001 0.001
(2.74)*** (2.28)** (0.09)
previous conflict 0.041 0.164
(0.16) (0.98)
frafcol 0.249 0.063 0.708 0.131 0.112
(0.29) (1.97)** (1.87)* (0.52) (0.48)
youngmenpop 16.79 0.470 6.944 1.631 5.210
(1.49) (0.79) (0.87) (0.30) (1.06)
mountain 0.015 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002
(1.73)* (1.77)* (0.65) (0.75) (0.47)
Observations 696 688 728 649 736
Wald exogeneity p 0.0184 0.0023 0.0057
Joint endogeneity p 0.0348 0.0138 0.0212
Instrument overid p 0.1161 0.5573 0.4091
Excl. instr. F lnsxp 51.61 63.18 74.74
Excl. instr. F lnsxp 98.03 139.87 155.37
Notes: Dependent variable is warstart according to two different datasets: Correlates of War (COW)
by Gleditsch (2004) and Armed Conflict Database (ACD) by Gleditsch et al. (2002). Column (1) shows
a basic regression performed with rare events logit, corresponding to Table 2, column (3). Column (2)
shows core specification (corresponding to Table 2, column (4)) in linear random effects panel IV
regression. Columns (3) and (5) code ongoing conflicts as 0 instead of missing and include
a dummy variable for conflict in the previous period. Only 2nd stage results shown. Exogenous
instruments for lnsxp and lngdp in 1st stage are openness, latitude, and total natural resource wealth
(lnnatcap) in columns (4)–(5), and additionally presidential, tropics, and distcr in columns (2)–(3).
Joint endogeneity test (Wu-Hausman), instrument over-identification test (Sargan N*R-sq), and tests
on excluded instruments (F-statistics) performed in linear regression. Absolute value of z-statistics
in parentheses. *,**,*** statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions
include an intercept (not shown).
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variables (population size, fractionalization, mountainous territory), although
there is little change in the magnitude of the coefficients. In the first stage, violent
conflict in the previous period still increases resource dependence (the coefficient
of the dummy variable is significant at the 10% level), while it does not significantly
affect income levels.
Columns (4) and (5) represent a radical departure from our earlier regressions,
as we now switch to another dependent variable—the conflict dummy from the
Armed Conflict Database (ACD). The obvious difference with our earlier ‘onset
of war’ variable, taken from the Correlates of War (COW) dataset, is that the
ACD variable captures more violent incidents. Specifically, the ACD dataset takes
25 battle-deaths per year as the threshold value above which an incident is
counted, and the COW variable only includes violence with an annual death toll
exceeding 1000. As a result of the lower threshold, the number of ‘war’ observations
in the sample increases to around 90. Arguably, violent incidents with a number
of casualties close to the 25 threshold level do not represent war as commonly
understood, but it is interesting to see if small-scale violence responds to the
same triggers as civil war.
Columns (4) and (5) suggest it does not. In column (4) we report results using
the two-step ivprobit routine as above with ongoing conflicts coded as missing,
and in column (5) we again code it as 0 and introduce a dummy variable to capture
previous conflict. We find the results using the ACD data are different from the
ones for the COW dataset. First-stage results still suggest that previous episodes
of conflict significantly increase resource dependence. Moreover, while it is still
the case that resource abundance has an important indirect and attenuating effect
on the onset of violence via income, we now also find that resource dependence
enters significant and positive.17 With other words, resources—or possibly the
distribution of resource rents—do not seem a reason for full-blown war, where
issues related to grievance (e.g., economic underdevelopment) appear to be more
important; but they may trigger smaller-scale conflicts.
Since resource abundance increases both income and dependence in the first
stage, and since income and dependence have opposite effects in the second stage,
the net effect of abundance on small scale violence is ambiguous. Combining
results from the first and second stages, we can assess the net effect of resources
on violence. Specifically, a one-standard deviation increase in resource abundance
decreases the risk of all levels of conflict via higher incomes by around 0.46%,
and simultaneously increases the risk via increased resource dependence by circa
0.38%. The net effect of resource abundance, therefore, continues to be a reduction
..........................................................................................................................................................................
17We have repeated this analysis using subsoil and land-based resource abundance variables, and the
qualitative results are identical to the ones for the aggregate abundance variable. Note that the presi-
dential dummy variable, tropical location and distance to the coast or navigable river proved weak
instruments in the specifications using the ACD dataset and were therefore dropped, leaving three strong
exogenous instruments.
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in the probability of conflict, although the limited magnitude in fact suggests
that resources are not a major determinant of conflict in any event.
4. Discussion and conclusions
According to both the economics and political science literature, natural resources
tend to magnify the risk of civil war. This resource-war link is often viewed as
one of the dimensions of the paradoxical resource curse perspective—the view
that more of a good thing may be bad for development.
In this paper we qualify this interpretation, and indeed turn received wisdom
upside down. We find evidence of a link between resource wealth and the onset of
conflict, but demonstrate that it runs opposite to the usual perspective. Resource
wealth, via an income effect, lowers the probability of conflict, and especially of the
onset of a major conflict. Moreover, we find no evidence of an across-the-board
link running from resource dependence to civil war. Instead, the opposite chain
of causation appears true—conflict-torn societies become dependent on natural
resources, which arguably is hardly a paradox. Economic success and peace are
signalled by economic diversification and low dependence on natural resources
(even if such resources are physically abundant). Our findings are consistent
with the view that resource scarcity—rather than abundance—may drive conflict.18
While we believe the distinction between resource dependence (a flow variable)
and abundance (a stock variable) is valuable, and that the proper treatment of
endogeneity and reverse causality is essential, we do not view this as the definitive
treatment on resources and conflict. Our preferred abundance variable is only
available for up to 100 countries, and while it presents a nice combination of
industrial and developing countries, we cannot rule out that the dataset suffers
from selection bias (e.g., our natural capital measure may be easier to compute
for more peaceful countries). Moreover, while we believe our abundance variable
to be largely exogenous to conflict, by its nature it displays very little variation
over time. We view this as an inevitable consequence of analysing resource abun-
dance and attempting to tackle the endogeneity problem that compromises earlier
work on time-variant flow variables. Nevertheless, we appreciate that our treatment
of abundance in the core regressions represents an extreme perspective (indeed:
the opposite extreme of the annual export, production or rent variables featuring
in many panel studies). Importantly however, our main results appear robust
with respect to time-varying oil production and reserves data, which also cover
a wider range of countries and (conflict) episodes.
Two final remarks are in order. First, following most of the earlier work based
on resource dependence, we have excluded some of the most contested resources.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
18 Our cross-national analysis questions whether there is a general tendency for resource-rich countries
to be more conflict-prone, but we do not deny that natural resources played an important role within
certain countries.
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In particular, secondary (lootable) diamonds are often implicated as a driver of
conflict, but do not feature in our abundance variables. This is mainly for practical
reasons—diamonds are also not included in the commonly used primary exports
ratio variable, and therefore it appeared inappropriate to include diamond reserves
as an instrument. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that (lootable) diamond reserves
have a direct effect on the onset or duration of conflict, and we don’t wish to
downplay that possibility. Second, we have been silent on the exact mechanism
linking resource abundance and higher incomes to a reduced risk of the onset
of civil war. One interpretation is that the income of potential rebels is higher
(or that the quality and quantity of public goods provided by the government
improves—leader behaviour arguably matters; see Smith, 2004; or Caselli and
Cunningham, 2009), raising the opportunity cost of rebellion. A competing hypo-
thesis is that resource rents enable incumbent rulers to more effectively oppress
rebellion (e.g., Azam and Mesnard, 2003). Our results therefore do not settle the
greed versus grievance view on the resource-war link. Analysing this in more
detail is left for future work.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material (the Appendix) is available online at the OUP website.
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